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RESNICK V. ADAMS: 1 THE LAWFUL DENIAL
OF A JEWISH PRISONER'S RIGHT
TO KEEP KOSHER?
I. INTRODUCTION
2
Make no mistake. Herman Resnick is a criminal. Herman
Resnick is a convicted criminal in federal prison.3 Herman Resnick
is also an Orthodox Jew.
4
As an Orthodox Jew, Resnick strictly abides by the "laws of the
kashruth" (kashruth). According to kashruth, "[Resnick] must
maintain a strict kosher diet at all times, even when imprisoned."
6
For nearly six years, Resnick has been a prison inmate.7 Since
January 1998, Resnick has been incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary at Lompoc, California (Lompoc).8 Like many prisons in
the United States, Lompoc accommodates the religious dietary needs
of its inmates through a food disbursement program called the
Common Fare Program.9 In order for Resnick to receive a kosher
diet, all he had to do was submit an application to the Common Fare
Program.' 0 Resnick, however, refused to fill out the application."
1. 317 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. See Resnick v. Adams, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
On December 2, 1996, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California convicted Herman Resnick of one count of bank larceny
in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2113(b). Id.
3. See Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1057.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See Jamie Aron Forman, Jewish Prisoners and Their First Amendment
Right to a Kosher Meal: An Examination of the Relationship Between Prison
Dietary Policy and Correctional Goals, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 477, 482 (1999)
(emphasis added).
7. SeeResnick, 317 F.3d at 1057.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 1057-58.
10. Id. at 1058.
11. See id.
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Instead, Resnick bypassed the proper procedure and directly sent
letters to prison officials requesting kosher food.' 2  As a result,
Resnick was never provided with a kosher diet.
1 3
Resnick brought suit, alleging that the prison official's failure to
accommodate his request for a kosher diet violated his constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion. 14 The case eventually reached
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.15
The Ninth Circuit presented a very thorough and well-articulated
analysis of the applicable legal issues. 16  Ultimately, the court
affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to
the defendants based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. 17 In
affirming the district court's decision, the court held that summary
judgment was proper in this case because Resnick failed to even
"alleg[e] facts [constituting] a constitutional violation."' 18
In the end, however, Resnick was still denied his constitutional
right to receive a kosher diet in prison. Perhaps this fact alone may
indicate that the Ninth Circuit overlooked something in its analysis.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Obtaining a Kosher Diet Through the Common Fare Program
The Federal Bureau of Prisons created a program called the
"Common Fare Religious Diet program to accommodate the
religious dietary needs of observant Jewish inmates' 19 in United
States prisons.20 The Common Fare Program was created largely in
part because of the growing demand by prisoners.21 "The general
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1058.
15. Id. at 1059.
16. See id. at 1059-64.
17. Id. at 1064.
18. Id.
19. See Forman, supra note 6, at 524. Specifically, "'[t]he Bureau [of
prisons] provides inmates requesting a religious diet reasonable and equitable
opportunity to observe their religious dietary practice within the constraints of
budget limitations and the security and orderly running of the institution and
the Bureaus through a common fare menu."' Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 548.20
(1997)).
20. See 28 C.F.R. § 548.20(a) (2003).
21. See Forman, note 6, at 509 n.186.
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parameters of the [Program] ... set forth in section seven of Program
Statement Number 4700.04 (P.S. 4700.04), ' 22 provides:
The increased number of religious groups requesting diets
requires a religious diet program that provides equity to all.
Common Fare is intended to accommodate inmates whose
religious dietary needs cannot be met on the main line. The
common fare menu is based upon a 14-day cycle with
special menus for the ten recognized Federal Holidays. The
menus have been nutritionally analyzed and certified as
exceeding minimum daily nutritional requirements.
23
According to P.S. 4700.04, if inmates require a religious diet,
they must submit an application to the prison chaplain.24 In addition,
inmates requesting a special religious diet are also required to
"'provide a written statement articulating the religious motivation for
participation in the common fare program [sic].' 25 Upon admission
and orientation to the prison, the Religious Services Department also
provides each inmate with a handout that discusses religious diets
and provides "'more specific guidance about the [Common Fare
Program] . . .and the procedures for applying to the program."'
26
The handout also includes a standard application form that describes
the Common Fare Program and "reiterates the need to submit an
application for the [Common Fare Program] to the chaplain."
27
B. Resnick's Failure to Comply with Proper Procedure
Resnick, like all newly arrived inmates at Lompoc, was aware of
the Common Fare Program at Lompoc and was notified of the proper
22. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1058.
23. See Forman, supra note 6, at 524-25. Program Statement 4700.04
mandates a national policy governing the religious diet menu program at
Bureau of Prisons institutions. Id.
24. Id. "'[T]he Chaplain is the approving official for inmate participation
and removal in the Common Fare Program."' 28 C.F.R. § 548.20(a).
25. 28 C.F.R. § 548.20(a).
26. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1058 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 548.20(a)).
27. Id. "Once an inmate has applied to the... [Common Fare Program],
and the chaplain has approved the application, the chaplain is responsible for
entering the necessary information into the computerized database known as
Sentry." Thereafter, "'the inmate shall ordinarily begin eating from the
Common Fare menu within two days after Food Service receives electronic
notification."' Id.
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procedure to obtain a kosher diet.28  Nonetheless, Resnick was
informed by a prison chaplain "that he would be required to submit
an application to participate in the [Common Fare Program] if he
desired to receive kosher meals., 29 Resnick simply refused to do
so. 30 Instead of complying with proper procedure and submitting an
application, Resnick wrote "letters to prison officials and the
Lompoc chaplains requesting kosher food.",
3 1
In response to these letters, a Lompoc chaplain wrote back to
Resnick, "asking [Resnick] to 'please see. .. [a chaplain] and fill out
an application for inclusion in [the] program.' ' 32 The chaplain also
indicated that if Resnick encountered any problems, they would be
"addressed appropriately by Food Service and Religious Services." 33
"Lompoc warden Michael Adams also responded to Resnick's
letter[s]. 34 Adams specifically informed Resnick that "'[flood
Service and Religious Services ... [were] willing to work with
[Resnick and other] inmates who have identified special needs
regarding religious diet.' 35 Adams also urged Resnick to apply to
the Common Fare Program and inform staff of any problems "'so
that [they] may be resolved.'
36
In the end, Resnick did not comply with the proper procedures.
37
Because Resnick did not "fil[e] the required application to enter the
[Common Fare Program] by the time he wrote the letters to [the]
prison officials,"3 8 Resnick did not receive a kosher diet.39
C. Resnick Alleges Violation of His Constitutional Rights
On August 19, 1998, Resnick filed a pro se action in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id. These letters written by Resnick "were dated June 28 and 29, 1999,
some 16 months after he was first incarcerated at Lompoc." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id
38. Id.
39. Id.
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among other violations,40 that defendants infringed his constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion by denying him kosher meals in
prison.41  Resnick's suit, after encountering several procedural
hurdles, 42 was eventually referred to a magistrate judge.43  With
permission of the court, Resnick filed amended complaints,4 naming
Michael Adams and Mike Szafir as primary defendants.45
On February 25, 2000, defendants moved for summary
judgment, claiming that they were entitled to qualified immunity.46
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny
defendants' motion for summary judgment.47  The district court,
however, rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation and
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
48
In Resnick v. Adams, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary
judgment to the prison officials on qualified immunity grounds.
49
40. Id. Specifically, Resnick "assert[ed] claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) and [Bivens v. Six
Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)]."
Id.
41. See id.
42. See Resnick, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
43. Id. Referral of the case was administered pursuant to Local Magistrate
Rule 1.3. Id.
44. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1059. In its opinion, the court stated:
Resnick filed his first amended complaint which named various prison
officials as defendants in their individual capacities. The magistrate
judge, in response to the prison officials' April 1999 motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim,
recommended that the district court dismiss with prejudice all of
Resnick's claims against defendants in their official capacities, and
dismiss without prejudice Resnick's First Amendment and equal
protection claims against defendants in their individual capacities. On
August 6, 1999, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report
and recommendation and granted Resnick leave to file a second
amended complaint.
Id.
45. See id.
46. See id. For a brief discussion of qualified immunity, see discussion
infra Part III.A.
47. See id.
48. See id. The order granting summary judgment was entered on July 12,
2001. Id.
49. See id. at 1064.
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The court concluded that Resnick clearly had a constitutional right to
a kosher diet in prison.50 However, in affirming the district court's
decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that the prison officials did not
violate that constitutional right.5 Specifically, the court determined
that summary judgment was proper in this case because Resnick
failed to even "alleg[e] facts [constituting] a constitutional
violation. ,
52
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. Evaluating a Claim for Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined qualified
immunity as "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation." 53  Only "'when a public official acts in
reliance on a duly enacted statute or ordinance, [may] that official
[be] entitled to qualified immunity."54
In evaluating a claim for qualified immunity, a court must
consider two questions. 55 First, as a threshold question, a court must
ask, "'Taken in the light most favorable to the party assessing the
injury, do the facts alleged show that the officer's conduct violated a
constitutional right?"' 5  A court should only proceed to the second
question when "'a violation could be made out on a favorable view
of the parties' submissions."
57
The "next, sequential step" a court should take in evaluating a
claim of qualified immunity is "'asking whether the right was clearly
established.' 58 In determining whether a particular right is clearly
established, the "'question is what the officer reasonably understood
his powers and responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly
established standards."' 59  Specifically, "'the right the official is
50. See id. at 1061.
51. See id. at 1064.
52. Id.
53. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
54. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1063 n.6 (quoting Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d
1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999)).
55. Id. at 1059 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 291 (2001)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1063 n.6 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208).
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alleged to have violated must have been "clearly established" in a
more particularized, and hence more relevant sense.""'6  That is,
"'the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' 6 1
B. The Ninth Circuit's Qualified Immunity Analysis
1. Recognition of the District Court's error
The Ninth Circuit appropriately began its analysis by first
"identify[ing] precisely the constitutional violation being asserted by
Resnick. 6 2  The court correctly established that Resnick had a
constitutional right to receive a kosher diet in prison.63 However,
after recognizing that Resnick was entitled to such a right, the court
realized that such a constitutional violation was not at issue here.
64
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court held
that the district court erred in the manner it reached its decision.
65
The Ninth Circuit perceptively recognized that the district court
mistakenly skipped a step in evaluating the claim for qualified
immunity by "proceed[ing] directly to the issue of whether Resnick's
right to a kosher diet was 'clearly established."'' 66 After recognizing
this mistake, the Ninth Circuit completed the qualified immunity
analysis.
67
The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that the district court actually
"misidentified the alleged constitutional violation" asserted by
Resnick.68 The court stated that "'the only conduct in which
60. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1059.
63. Id. at 1061. The court followed the precedent established in Ashelman
v. Wawrzaszkek, 111 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1997) that prisoners have a First
Amendment right to be "provided with food.. . that satisfies the dietary laws
of their religion." (quoting McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.
1987)). Specifically, prison officials must prepare and serve inmates who
require it food that fully meets the requirements of religious dietary laws. See
Ashelman, 111 F.3d at 678.
64. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1059.
65. Id. at 1060.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1059-64.
68. Id. at 1061.
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[defendants] engaged that could have violated [Resnick's] First
Amendment rights was their insistence that he submit an application
for the Common Fare Program before attempting to negotiate a diet
that would satisfy the laws of kashruth. ,,69 The court held that the
district court incorrectly "focus[ed] on the 'implications of providing
Resnick kosher meals"' and did not realize that "[t]he prison officials
were not refusing to provide Resnick with kosher meals; rather, they
merely were requiring him to file a standardized application before
doing so."
70
In making this distinction, the court concluded that "'the only
conduct in which [defendants] engaged that could have violated
[Resnick's] First Amendment rights was their insistence that he
submit an application for the Common Fare Program."'
71
2. Resnick's lack of standing to bring a claim
In addition, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Resnick lacked
standing to bring a claim.72 The court stated that since "Resnick
never applied for, let alone participated in, the [Common Fare
Program], the evidence [Resnick] adduce[d] to demonstrate the
failure of the [Common Fare Program] to provide kosher meals [was]
irrelevant., 73  As such, the court held that "'[u]nless Resnick
participated, or attempted to participate, in the [Common Fare
Program], he could not [have been] injured by, and would [not have
had] standing to challenge, deficiencies in the administration of the
program at Lompoc.'
74
Furthermore, the court addressed Resnick's contention that "he
was excused from applying for the [Common Fare Program] because
[submitting] any such application would have been futile. 75 The
court pointed out that "uncontroverted evidence" existed which
"indicate[d] that [submitting] such an application would not have
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1060. The "defendants did not categorically refuse to provide
Resnick with a kosher diet." Id. at 1059.
72. Id. at 1059.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67
(1972) (holding that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge club's membership
policies because "[plaintiff] never sought to become a member")).
75. Id. at 1060.
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been futile." 76 "First, prison officials did not categorically refuse to
provide Resnick with kosher meals, nor did they tell him that the
[Common Fare Program] was the only way for him to receive a
kosher meal.",77 "Instead, [the prison officials] assured Resnick that,
once he applied to the [Common Fare Program], they would work
with him to ensure that his problems [would be] addressed
appropriately."
78
Furthermore, the court correctly ruled that Resnick could not
"claim that his application would have been futile. 79  The court
indicated "that there was at least one inmate at Lompoc [who
received] a completely kosher diet." 80  This information
"establish[ed] that prison officials were capable of working with
Resnick to guarantee that his needs would be addressed
appropriately." 81  In addition, the "[flact that another prisoner
receive[ed] the type of kosher diet to which Resnick contend[ed] he
[had] a right, clearly support[ed] the inference that, had he submitted
an application to participate in the Common Fare Program, Resnick
could have received the kind of religious diet he sought.
8 2
3. Determining whether a prison regulation violates a constitutional
right under a "reasonableness test"
"The district court's order, however, while very thorough and
reasoned," failed to "make an evaluation regarding the nature of the
alleged constitutional violation at the start of the analysis." 83 As
such, the Ninth Circuit assessed the "alleged constitutional violation
... and its importance to the qualified immunity analysis."
84
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1195 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that where a prisoner has decided "not to follow the simple
procedure of registering his religion" with prison authorities, and where
prisoner has failed to make a "substantial showing" that registration would be
futile, prisoner lacks standing to bring suit)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1060 n.4.
83. Id. at 1060.
84. Id.
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First, the Ninth Circuit "determined that prison regulations...
alleged to tread upon constitutional liberties should be evaluated
under a 'reasonableness' test.",85 The court established that even
though "'prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution,' 8 a test that was "'less
restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
fundamental constitutional rights' ' 7 was appropriate in this case.88
Following the bright-line standard established by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Turner v. Safely,89 the Ninth Circuit
proceeded in analyzing Resnick's allegation.
According to the test set forth in Turner, in determining the
reasonableness of a prison regulation, "'when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."' 90 Turner
established that in determining whether a regulation is reasonable, a
court must balance and weigh four factors: (1) Was there a "valid,
rational connection" between the regulation and the governmental
interest?; (2) Are there alternative means available to the inmate
which would permit him to exercise his religious beliefs?; (3) What
impact would the accommodations to the prisoner have on the
guards, other inmates, and the institution in general?; and (4) Do
"obvious, easy alternatives" exist that may be regarded as evidence
that the regulation is not reasonable?91
85. Id. at 1060-61.
86. Id. at 1060 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)).
87. Id. (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
88. Id. The rationale is based on mere practicality, because "'[s]ubjecting
the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration."' Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
89. 482 U.S. 78.
90. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
91. Id. at 1061-62.
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4. Analysis under Turner's balancing test
The Ninth Circuit pointed out:
[The] district court correctly noted that Turner's balancing
test was applicable, but did not proceed through the four-
part analysis required. The [district] court instead
mistakenly concluded that because the prison officials
failed to 'delineate the budgetary, security or administrative
implications of providing Resnick kosher meals...
[Resnick] ... met his burden of demonstrating that the right
allegedly violated was clearly established.'
92
The Ninth Circuit realized that the district court's "conclusion
ignore[ed] [their] own finding that 'the only conduct in which [the
prison officials] engaged that could have violated [Resnick's] First
Amendment rights was their insistence that he submit an application
for the Common Fare Program before attempting to negotiate a diet
that would satisfy the laws of kashruth."' 93 Appropriately, the Ninth
Circuit completed "the balancing analysis-focusing on Resnick's
failure to file the required [Common Fare Program] application
rather than the [prison officials'] alleged denial of kosher food.",
9 4
As stated above, Turner weighs four factors in determining the
reasonableness of a prison regulation affecting constitutional rights.
95
The first factor requires "'a valid, rational connection between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it. ,,96 Here, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
legitimate governmental interest at stake was "the orderly
administration of a program that allow[ed] federal prisons to
accommodate the religious dietary needs of thousands of
92. Id. at 1061.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that if the district court "had performed the
balancing analysis-focusing on Resnick's failure to file the required
[Common Fare Program] application rather than the prison's alleged denial of
kosher food-the district court's own findings of fact and conclusions of law,
viewed in light of Turner's four factors, would support the conclusion that
there was no constitutional violation." Id.
95. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
96. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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prisoners." 97 The court held that it was "clear that the application for
the Common Fare Program at Lompoc [had] a 'valid, rational
connection' to this legitimate interest." 98 The application "[set] forth
the ground rules of the [Common Fare Program], provid[ed] an
opportunity for the chaplain to assess the sincerity of the applicant's
belief, and, most important, provid[ed] a standardized form for each
inmate seeking accommodation, thereby aiding in the administration
of the program." 99 Therefore, the court concluded that "the first
Turner factor [was] satisfied."100
The second Turner factor is "'whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates."
01
The court determined that this factor weighed "in favor of the prison
officials since Resnick [had] not shown, and indeed [could not]
show, that he would not have been provided with a kosher diet had
he filed the proper application."' 1 2 Here, the prison officials were
"willing to work with Resnick once he submitted his application to
ensure his needs were met."' 3 In addition, "there also was at least
one other inmate at Lompoc receiving a completely kosher diet."'
10 4
The third factor in determining the reasonableness of a prison
regulation under Turner is "'the impact accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on other inmates, the guards,
97. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 548.20; P.S. 4700.04).
98. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1061.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
102. Id. at 1062.
103. Id.
104. Id. As the court aptly noted:
It is this factor that distinguish[ed] Resnick's claim from those
of the inmates in Ward and Ashelman. In those cases, inmates
seeking kosher diets were explicitly denied kosher diets. That is to
say, the prison officials in Ward and Ashelman did not deny that
they were refusing to supply the complaining inmates with kosher
food. Rather, they openly admitted that they were not doing so
and argued that the Constitution did not require them to do so.
Here, however, prison officials [did] not dispute that Resnick
[had] a right to a kosher diet; they argu[ed] only that requiring
him to comply with the application requirement [did] not violate
that constitutional right.
Id. at 1062 n.5 (citations omitted).
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and prison resources." 10 5 The court made clear once more that "the
accommodation Resnick [sought was] not of his right to a kosher
diet, but rather of his right to a kosher diet without having to file the
standard application."10 6 Thus, if the prison accommodated this
request, it would have frustrated "the orderly administration of the
[Common Fare Program] and of [the prison itself] generally by
effectively eliminating the requirement that inmates seeking religious
diets fill out a standardized application form." 10 7 Thus, the third
factor also cut in favor of the prison officials.1
0 8
The fourth and final factor is the availability of "'obvious, easy
alternatives."' 10 9 The Ninth Circuit held that the most "obvious" and
"easy" alternative for inmates who sought a religious diet was the
requirement of filling out "the standard [Common Fare Program]
application form."" 0 The Common Fare Program at Lompoc
provided for a uniform procedure for inmate requests, allowing "the
prison to channel those requests through the chaplain's office, which
assess[ed] the sincerity of his request for a religious diet and, upon
approval, enter[ed] the prisoner into a computerized database."'
The court dismissed Resnick's alternative argument--"that the
application requirement be waived or that his letters to prison
authorities be deemed sufficient in lieu of the application itself-
noting that it would make accommodating prisoners' religious
dietary needs a far more complicated affair." ' 1 2  The court
recognized that if the prison allowed inmates to make requests
105. Id. at 1062 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
106. Id.
107. Id. The court, noting the validity of the Common Fare Program, stated:
[B]y providing a procedure by which religious believers can
request and receive special diets, it would appear that the prison
has acted to advance, not infiinge, the free exercise rights of the
inmates. It would be a strange result indeed to conclude that such
a program-designed to facilitate the accommodation of the
religious dietary needs of thousands of inmates-actually violates
inmates' First Amendment rights.
Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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outside this system, it "would frustrate the orderly administration...
at Lompoc and other prisons.""
3
After applying the four factors, the court concluded that "the
requirement that Resnick submit an application to the [Common Fare
Program] before prison officials attempted to provide him with a
kosher diet [was] 'reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."" 14 Therefore, "the district court's own findings of fact
and conclusions of law, viewed in light of Turner's four factors,
[supported] the conclusion that there was no constitutional violation"
at issue." 5
5. Determining whether a particular right is clearly established
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to the "'the next, sequential
step"' in the qualified immunity analysis: "'whether the right was
clearly established.""'1 6 In determining whether a particular right is
clearly established, the appropriate inquiry is "'what the officer
reasonably understood his powers and responsibilities to be, when he
acted, under clearly established standards.""'1 7 In this case, the court
determined that the prison officials "were acting within the context
of a federal prison.""8
"[I]t is also clearly established that 'when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.""' 9  The
113. Id. (quoting Jackson-Bey, 115 F.3d at 1097).
Registration puts the institution on notice that certain religious
accommodations will likely be sought and thereby provides the
institution with time to consider if and how to implement
them .... In short, registration places, at most, a slight burden
on an inmate's right to religious freedom while serving as an
important and beneficial 'bright line' that enables prison officials
to ascertain the seriousness of the inmate's religious commitment
and respond accordingly.
Id.
114. Id. at 1063 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
115. See id. at 1061.
116. Id. at 1063 n.6 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
117. Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208; citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at
640).
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The court noted that "'[1]awful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying
[Vol. 37:45
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court aptly noted that the application requirement for the Common
Fare Program at Lompoc was valid because it served two such
interests: (1) "it enable[ed] prison officials to assess the sincerity of
an inmate's religious belief';' 20 and (2) it "aid[ed] in the efficient
and orderly administration of the prison" by "requiring each inmate
requesting a religious diet to file an identical form containing
information regarding the [Common Fare Program].' 12 1 Thus, the
court stated that it was "eminently reasonable for [the prison
officials] to have believed that requiring Resnick to file an
application for the [Common Fare Program] was lawful."'
' 22
Furthermore, the court also noted that the prison officials "were
acting in reliance on 28 C.F.R. § 548.20(a), as elaborated in P.S.
4700.04 and Lompoc regulations, when they required Resnick to
submit an application."' 23 The court reiterated, "'[W]hen a public
official acts in reliance on a duly enacted statute or ordinance, that
official ordinarily is entitled to qualified immunity." ' 124 Ultimately,
the court did not identify a constitutional violation. 125 Accordingly,
the court did not proceed in analyzing qualified immunity.
126
C. Analysis of Resnick 's Alternative Arguments
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit addressed Resnick's two alternative
arguments. 127  Resnick first contended that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Sloman v. Tadlock12 8 required the court
"to conclude that the issue of reasonableness in this context was a
factual question for the jury, not the judge, to decide."' 129 The Ninth
Circuit, however, rejected Resnick's contention. The court reasoned:
[the] penal system."' Id. (quoting O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. (quoting Babbitt, 833 F.2d at 198 ("It is appropriate for prison
authorities to deny a special diet if an inmate is not sincere in his religious
beliefs.")).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027).
125. Id. at 1063.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1064.
128. 21 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
129. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1063 n.7.
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Sloman was decided seven years before Saucier, in which
the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that 'to deny
summary judgment any time a material issue of fact
remains . . . could undermine the goal of qualified
immunity to avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.' 1
30
As such, the court stated that Saucier "[made] clear that
reasonableness [was] a question of law to be decided by the court,
not the jury."'1
3 1
Resnick alternatively contended that "the prison officials'
refusal to investigate and to correct problems with the [Common
Fare Program] at Lompoc was itself unreasonable and a violation of
[his] First Amendment rights."'132 Resnick's other contention was
also rejected by the court. As stated previously, the "prison officials
promised to work with [Resnick]--once he filed the proper form-to
ensure that any problems he had with the program were
addressed."'133 Therefore, the court correctly held that "Resnick's
charge that the officials failed to investigate [was] belied by their
own promises to conform the [Common Fare Program] to meet [his]
needs."' 134  "'[U]nless Resnick participated, or attempted to
participate, in the Common Fare Program, he could not be injured
by, and would have no standing to challenge, deficiencies in the
administration of the program at Lompoc. ' '" 13 5  Thus, the court
properly noted that "[i]f Resnick lack[ed] standing to challenge the
deficiencies of the program itself, surely he [could not] challenge an
alleged failure to investigate allegations of deficiencies in that same
program."'
136
130. Id. at 1063-64 n.7 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1064.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Madsen v. Boise State Univ., 976 F.2d 1219, 1220-21 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("There is a long line of cases ... that hold that a plaintiff lacks
standing to challenge a rule or policy to which he has not submitted himself by
actually applying for the desired benefit.")).
136. Id.
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Resnick further contended that the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Alexander v. Perril137 supported his claim. However, the court
determined that the Alexander decision did not apply because the
case "involved a situation in which prison officials 'did nothing to
inquire into or investigate [the inmate's] complaints."" 38 The court
noted that in that situation:
[P]rison officials stood willing to work with Resnick to
correct any problems he had with the [Common Fare
Program]. That prison officials never did so [was] the
result of Resnick's failure to comply with the requirement
that he apply for the [Common Fare Program] rather than
any dereliction of duty on the part of the officials. And
since it was not unreasonable for prison officials to require
Resnick to apply for the [Common Fare Program] before
providing him with a kosher diet, it similarly [could not] be
unreasonable for them to require him to apply to the
program before working with him to address his complaints
about it. 
139
The court concluded, stating that "Resnick [did] not alleg[e] facts
sufficient to constitute a constitutional violation."'140 In so holding,
the court affirmed the "district court's order granting summary
judgment to the prison officials."'
141
IV. EVALUATION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. A Case of "Forms over Substance "
142
The district court correctly found that Resnick had a clearly
established right to a kosher diet while in Lompoc. 143 The Ninth
137. 916 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, the Ninth Circuit, in
affirming the district court's denial of defendants' motion for summary
judgment on defense of qualified immunity, held that warden and
administrative systems manager had clearly established duty to investigate
prisoner's claims regarding foreign jail credits and miscalculation of sentence.
Id.
138. Id. at 1395.
139. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1064.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, Resnick v. Adams, 317 F.3d 1056 (9th
Cir. 2002) (No. 01-56710) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief].
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Circuit presented a very thorough and accurate analysis. 44 The court
concluded that Resnick "did not alleg[e] facts sufficient to constitute
a constitutional violation."' 45 The court ultimately denied Resnick a
kosher diet because he did not file the proper form in applying for
the Common Fare Program. 1
46
Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's analysis, a troublesome fact
remains. In the end, after all was said and done, Resnick was still
denied a constitutional right-the right to receive a kosher diet in
prison. This fact alone perhaps lends credence to the contention that
something was overlooked in the Ninth Circuit's analysis; common
sense dictates something might be wrong.1
47
On the surface, the Ninth Circuit's analysis appears correct and
accurate. The court decided that since Resnick did not request food
from the Common Fare menu, Resnick could not assert a
constitutional violation by the defendants based upon asserted
defects in the Common Fare Program.' 48 The court determined that
the only potential constitutional violation was the requirement that
Resnick submit the standard application for the Common Fare
Program as a prerequisite to addressing his request for a religious
diet. 149 After identifying the alleged constitutional violation at issue,
the court held that the prison official's actions were constitutional
because a reasonable prison official could have believed that it was
lawful to require inmates to submit standard applications for a
religious diet.
However, in granting summary judgment to defendants based on
qualified immunity, it could be viewed that the court
unconstitutionally denied a prisoner a kosher diet because of the
prisoner's failure to file a form applying for a program that the
prisoner repeatedly objected to as not meeting religious standards. In
other words, this was a case of "forms over substance,"' 150 and
unfortunately, Resnick never received a kosher diet as a result.
143. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1061.
144. See discussion infra Parts III.B-C.
145. Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1064.
146. See id.
147. The views expressed in this Comment are solely those of the author.
They do not reflect the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
148. SeeResnick, 317 F.3d at 1064.
149. Id. at 1060.
150. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 142, at 9.
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It is certainly indisputable that Resnick desired a kosher diet. It
is also indisputable that Resnick made efforts to secure a kosher diet
in prison. What is disputable, however, is the manner (form) which
Resnick pursued to receive a kosher diet. The facts indicated
Resnick wrote letters requesting a kosher diet and objecting to
Lompoc's failure to comply with the requirements of the Common
Fare Program. 151  Nevertheless, prison officials failed to
accommodate Resnick's requests.' Was this action reasonable?
Arguably, the answer is "No."
B. The "Reasonableness " of the Defendants'Action
In determining whether the prison officials acted reasonably in
denying Resnick a kosher diet, the court may have committed an
oversight. By granting summary judgment for defendants, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the government's argument that the prison
officials were reasonable in requiring that Resnick fill out a form for
the Common Fare Program. 153 The court explained that "Resnick's
letters to prison officials requesting a kosher diet and objecting to the
Common Fare [P]rogram were not sufficient to meet this
requirement."' 54 However, it is certainly arguable that Resnick's
letters should have been sufficient to meet this requirement.'55 "The
'standard application' would have provided prison officials no
information not already contained in Resnick's letters.' 56 In fact,
"the standard application [may have] provided less information than
151. See discussion supra Part II.B.
152. Id.
153. Appellant's Reply Brief at 4, Resnick v. Adams, 317 F.3d. 1056 (9th
Cir. 2002) (No. 01-56710). The defendants' refusal to provide Resnick a
kosher diet was unreasonable "or, at the very least, there was a material dispute
over whether it was unreasonable." Id.
154. Id. Resnick provided "several 'written statements' explaining his needs
and his objection to the Common Fare [P]rogram at Lompoc. Resnick also
repeatedly objected that the Common Fare [P]rogram at Lompoc did not meet
kosher dietary laws. To require him to apply for the very program he was
objecting to was not in any way reasonable." Id. at 5.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 4-5.
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Resnick's letters that detained his dietary requirements and why the
existing program was inadequate.' 57
It is difficult to accept a justification for denying Resnick a
kosher diet. The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that the prison
officials would have worked with Resnick to modify the Common
Fare diet. This, however, may not be true. Requiring Resnick "to
file an application for the very program that he [said] he [did] not
want and that [would] not meet his constitutional right to a kosher
diet," certainly cannot be construed as reasonable.'58 If in fact the
prison officials were reasonable, they "would have provided Resnick
with a kosher diet and not insisted that he file a form for a program
that did not meet his needs. ' 59 In addition, if the prison officials
were reasonable, they could have "modified the Common Fare
Program, as they asserted they were willing to do, and provided
Resnick a kosher diet."'160 For example, "[t]hey did not need to wait
for a form," especially since Resnick wrote letters requesting kosher
food. 16 1 Nevertheless, the court believed that the prison officials'
actions were reasonable.
C. The Importance ofAllowing Religious Observance in Prison
The Ninth Circuit's decision is even more troublesome in light
of the fact that religious observance in prison is essential to inmates'
spiritual livelihood. One of the "[t]he most universal complaints
received from observant .. . inmates is the inability to obtain
religiously acceptable food items."'162  In particular, religious
157. Id. 28 C.F.R. § 548.20 provides, "[t]he inmate will provide a written
statement articulating the religious motivation for participation in the common
fare program." Id.
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id. "Reasonable officers would have provided Resnick with a kosher
diet and not insisted that he file a form for a program that did not meet his
needs Resnick did not want the Common Fare program, at Lompoc, even with
minor modifications, because it was not kosher and 'working with him' was
not going to correct its many failings." Id.
160. See id. at 5-6.
161. Id. at 6. Summary judgment may not have been proper here because
there was "a dispute over material fact as to whether modification was a viable
solution here." Id.
162. Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, How the Grinch Stole Chanukah, 21 CARDOZO L.
REv. 707, 718 (1999). Before the 1960s, the courts rarely upheld prisoners'
free exercise of religion claims because of concerns that court intervention
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observers of kashruth have fought for the right to keep kosher in
prison because of its spiritual importance.
The Hebrew term "kashruth" is the "'collective term for the
Jewish laws and customs pertaining to the types of food permitted
for consumption and their preparation.' 163 The main purpose of
these laws is "not hygiene, but holiness." 'What is involved is the
issue of godliness.' 164 "Each person observing kashruth is treated
as if [he] were in a direct relationship with God, observing what in
other religions might be considered a priestly function at the table in
the sequence of preparation and service of food and of prayers."
'1 65
Observing kashruth, therefore, is not a frivolous notion. In fact,
it is a "'critical need of the Jew[s] to relate with [their] God in a
series of instructions that have been [their] mark of distinction from
the days that [they] left Egypt . . . thousands of years ago.""1
6 6
Because of its importance, "an observant Jew must maintain a strict
kosher diet ... even when imprisoned, and the kosher dietary laws
can be interrupted only when life is in danger."'
' 67
In a prison context though, religious observance plays an
especially "crucial role in managing a prison and the positive effects
that religion can have on an inmate is immeasurable."' 68 For one,
"the religious practice of adhering to kosher dietary laws has
beneficial effects on Jewish prisoners' spiritual development."' 69 In
addition, the practice of adhering to kosher dietary laws has "positive
effects on Jewish prisoners' attitudes and behaviors.' 7 °
Furthermore, by adhering to kosher dietary laws, Jewish prisoners
would interfere with the prisons' administration of penological objectives. Id.;
see also Rain Levy Minns, Food Fights: Redefining the Current Boundaries of
the Government's Positive Obligation to Provide Halal, 17 J. L. & POL. 713,
713 (2001). During the late 1960s, the majority of religious prisoner cases
involved Muslim prisoners' dietary restrictions, and often the courts used a
compelling interest standard, and therefore, sometimes found that prisoners
were entitled to a pork-free diet. Id. at 722.
163. See Forman, supra note 6, at 480.
164. Id. at 481.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 481-82.
168. Id. at 485.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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"gain a sense of identity."'171 Therefore, "'kashruth ... is far more
than a religious ritual, it is a bond which unites Jew to Jew, it is a
tether which secures an individual to a nation, it is the energy which
connects a people, and a nation, to its very roots."' 172 By denying
such an important right, the court is doing a grave injustice to not
only Jewish prisoners, but prisoners in general who seek to practice
religion.
V. CONCLUSION
"Religious freedom is the ability to practice one's own
religion.., without prosecution or discrimination.'' 173  However,
"the scope of this freedom is set within certain boundaries" such as
limits determined "by the needs of other [c]onstitutional,
governmental and policy goals."'174  "[T]he Constitution's First
Amendment guarantee of religious freedom is not an absolute
freedom, but a relative freedom.'
175
In regarding religious dietary restrictions in prison, "[the]
[g]overnment has some limited, positive obligations."' 176 Why? The
reason is simple. Prisons are "extremely closely regulated
environments in which uniformity of schedule, appearance, and diet,
are, for reasons of security and economy, very high priorities."' 77 In
prison, virtually any religious observance requires some minimal
governmental involvement. 178 This in turn creates a departure from
otherwise applicable policies. 179 Therefore, the right to receive an
adequate diet, such as kosher food, in prison is also subject to certain
restrictions. These restrictions on the right to receive a diet that
171. Id. "Kashruth for the contemporary Jew has become a rallying point for
Jewish identity. So much so that even non-observant Soviet prisoners of Zion
refused to consume non-kosher food in their prison cells in order to affirm their
identification with the Jewish people past, present and future. Some Soviet
Jewish heroes and heroines have subsisted on diets of tea and crackers for
years rather than let a non-kosher morsel pass through their mouths." Id.
172. Id. at486.
173. Minns, supra note 162, at 713.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAW OF PRISONS: IV., In the Belly of the
Whale: Religious Practice in Prison, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1891, 1891 (2002).
178. See id.
179. See id.
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satisfies religious dietary law must be "reasonably related to
legitimate penological concerns."'
' 80
The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Resnick v. Adams, concluded that the Common Fare Program
satisfied legitimate penological concerns, i.e., that the prison
regulation was constitutional. Seemingly, such a bright-line rule
protects a prisoner's constitutional rights. If a regulation is
reasonably related to penological concerns, it is constitutional. If it
is not, then a prisoner has a valid claim of constitutional violation. In
practice, however, courts have found that restrictions on religious
practice were usually constitutional. 18 1  Thus, it should not be
surprising that Resnick's allegation of a constitutional violation was
also rejected in this case.
Looking at the end result, considering the limitations on
religious freedom, the outcome just does not seem right. Failure to
fill out a form as an excuse for denying an Orthodox Jewish inmate
the kosher diet that his religion required and deemed so critical to
spiritual fulfillment, should not be a valid justification for abridging
a prisoner's constitutionally mandated right to receive a kosher diet.
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